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Two centuries ago, Sheridan invented the delightful charac ter  of Mrs. Malaprop, who 
had an unfailing ability to use the wrong word to the greatest  effect. Since Sheridan, the 
malapropism has been a s tandard tool of comic writers, especially useful for indicating 
inferior intellectual ability of a speaker (as when Archie Bunker says “ We need a few 
laughs to break up the m onogam y") .  But not all errors involving substitution of one 
word for another  result from ignorance of the correct  usage; on the contrary,  
inadvertent use of the wrong word is a common variety of speech e r ro r .1 In this article 
we will examine such word substitution errors (which we will call malapropisms, 
although they do not arise, as Mrs. M alaprop’s did, from ignorance); we will show that 
they reveal some interesting aspects  of the structure of the mental dictionary used in 
producing and understanding speech.
Consider  a typical example of a malapropism:
(1) T: If these two vectors are equivalent,  then . . .2
E: If these two vectors are equivocal,  then . . .
Here the speaker  has intended to say equivalent, but has inadvertently substituted for it 
equivocal. This error  illustrates well the three major characteris t ics of malapropisms. 
First, the erroneous  intrusion is a real word— not the intended word,  of  course,  but not 
a meaningless string of phonemes either. Second, the target and error  seem to be 
unrelated in meaning. Finally, there is a close relation between the pronunciation of the 
target and the pronunciation of the error.
Before we analyze in more detail the properties of this kind of error,  it would be
* An earl ier  version of  this article appeared in Texas Linguistic Forum  I, March 1975. The authors  wish 
to thank Merrill Garre t t  for encouragem ent  and financial ass is tance ( NI H grant No.  5 - R O I - H D 0 5 168-05 to 
J. A. F odor  and M. F. Garret t) ,  and two anonym ous  reviewers  for their helpful com m ents .
1 This type of  e r ror  has been observed by others;  for instance,  N oo teboom  (1969), Fromkin (1971; 1973, 
Introduction) ,  and T w eney ,  et al. (1975). Many of  the points made in the present  article were briefly noted by 
Fromkin (1971). The  detailed considerat ion of  the data  presented  here supports  F rom kin 's  suggestions and 
leads to some additional conclusions and implications.
2 Throughou t  this article the term target (T) will be used to refer to the intended ut terance ,  and error (E) 
to refer to the u t te rance  as spoken.  In examples  of  speech errors ,  dashes  (— ) indicate a pause by the speaker ,  
and dots ( . . . )  indicate that  the remainder  o f  the u t terance was not recorded.
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well to mention some other  classes of speech errors that look like malapropisms but in 
fact are not. The first class comprises errors in which the speech sounds in an utterance 
are misplaced: spoonerisms,  anticipations,  perseverat ions,  and omissions. Examples
(2)-(5) represent  typical cases of such errors.
. bone and joint  clinic.
. boin and jon t  clinic.
. carrot  and cabbage.
. cabbot  and carriage.
. splicing from one tape.
. splacing from one tape.
If you tend me— if you send me the time of your birth . . .
. . . pale sky.
. . . pale skay.
People bounce back and forth . . .
People pounce back and forth . . .
When panets— planets pass each other  . . .
A most important vote and repeat— replete with historical over­
tones . . .
The (a) examples represent  cases in which an error  of  this type has produced a 
nonword in English, while the (b) cases show that such errors  may also result in real 
English words.  In example (2), two phonem es3 have switched places in the utterance.  
In (3), a phonem e has been anticipated, and in (4) the speaker  has persevera ted  by 
repeating a phoneme that occurred earlier in the sentence.  In (5), a single phoneme has 
been omitted from the intended utterance.
A second type of  error  involving the sound segments of  a word arises when two 
synonyms are blended together.  Usually this results in a nonword ,  but again, a real 
word of  English will occasionally occur;  examples  are given in (6):
(2) a. T
E
b. T
E
(3) a. T
E
b. E
(4) a. T
E
b. T
E
(5) a. E
b. E
(6) a. T
E
b. T 
E
gripping/grasping
grisping
heritage/legacy
heresy
Obviously,  when we look for malapropisms,  we must  be careful to exclude cases of 
word substi tution that  might equally well be spoonerisms,  anticipations,  perservat ions,  
omissions,,  or blends. (A further  lesson to be drawn is that in collecting speech errors  it 
is important  to note the full linguistic context  as well as the s p e a k e r ’s intuition about 
the intended u t te rance ,  in order  to be able to perform this categorization correctly.)
:i See Fromkin  (1971) for ev idence  that it is indeed phonem es ,  ra ther  than phones ,  that are involved in 
these errors .
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A third class of errors that must be distinguished from malapropisms is that of 
semantic errors.  Often these errors consist  in saying the antonym of the intended word; 
(7)—(9) are typical examples:
(7) T good
E bad
(8) T nearlv
E barely
(9) T specific
E general
(10) T:
E:
(11) T:
E:
(12) E:
(13) E:
Other  kinds of semantic errors involve substitution of body parts or articles of clothing, 
as in (10) or (11), or changes in a semantic feature (e.g. time and space),  as in (12) and
(13):
Don't  burn your f ingers .1 
D on’t burn your toes.
He got hot under  the collar.
He got hot under  the belt.
The two contemporary— sorry,  adjacent buildings
Not Thackeray ,  but someone that wrote below Thackeray— before 
Thackeray .
This is by no means an exhaustive classification of semantic errors.
Unfortunately ,  separating semantic errors from true malapropisms is not a task 
that can be performed mechanically. In compiling the data  used in this study we have 
relied on our  intuitions as to what words were semantically related; where we have 
considered that a semantic relation existed, the error was eliminated from our  list. As 
far as we can see, the malapropisms discussed in this article involve no similarity of 
meaning between target and error.
From a collection of over  2000 errors  in speech compiled by the first author,  we 
initially selected all errors that involved word substi tution (397). F rom  this initial list we 
eliminated all errors  that could have arisen from the sources discussed ab o v e .3 The 
remaining corpus  comprised 183 errors.  These  errors ,  the malapropisms,  have some 
interesting properties.  First,  the target and the error  are of the same grammatical 
category in 99% of the cases.  Second,  the target and the error  frequently have the same
4 E xam ples  (10) and ( I I )  com e from Fromkin (1973, Appendix);  example  (12) is from N oo teboom  (1969).
3 As a conserva t ive  s tra tegy,  all e r rors  involving addit ion,  delet ion,  o r  subst i tut ion of a single phoneme 
were omit ted ,  since these may be phonological errors .  Fur the r ,  malapropisms involving preposit ions,  
adverbs ,  and c o m p o u n d  nouns were also eliminated.  These  kinds of malapropisms are rare and seem to have 
slightly different proper t ies  from the more frequent errors  involving nouns,  verbs ,  and adject ives;  the major  
difference is that they have a much higher incidence of  d isagreement  on num ber  o f  syllables. We hope to 
d iscuss  these exam ples  in a future paper.  The  pairs that comprised  the data  for this article are listed in an
Appendix  at the end.
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number  of  syllables (87% agreement in our  list).H Third, they almost always have the 
same stress pattern (98% agreement) .7 Table 1 summarizes  these results:
Table 1
Agreement on:
Grammatical Number o f Stress
Category Syllables Pattern
Malapropisms 99% 87% 98%
Semantic Errors 75% 82%
For comparison,  the semantic errors  mentioned above can be tested for the same 
properties.  To do this we supplemented the 43 semantic  errors  eliminated from our 
original data  with 36 found in Fromkin (1973), for a total of 79 errors.  The target and 
error  in this case agreed on number  o f  syllables in 75% of  the pairs. Of the polysyllabic 
semantic  errors  agreeing on number  of  syllables (27 pairs), 82% agreed on stress 
pattern. Of  course ,  all of  the pairs agreed in grammatical  category,  because of  the 
nature of  the semantic relations involved (antonyms; members  of  the same semantic 
field, e.g. body parts; and so on). These results are included in Table I.
Clearly, then, this coincidence of properties between target and error  exhibited by 
malapropisms is not accidenta l .8 We will show that it has strong implications for a 
theory of  the mental lexicon. Before considering these implications further,  however ,  
we should devote  some attention to the mechanisms by which malapropisms might 
occur;  that is, we should sketch the relevant parts of a theory of  speech production.
At a certain point in the production of  a sentence a grammatical s tructure must be 
framed to carry the meaning that the speaker  intends to convey.  This structure can be 
thought of as incorporating both the syntactic propert ies  of the impending u t terance (in 
the form, say, of  a phrase structure),  and the meanings of the words  to be used. What is 
not in the s tructure  initially is any specification of the phonological characteris t ics  of  
the chosen words.  For these the speech production device must look into its mental
'' There  were  four pairs that  disagreed on num ber  o f  syllables due to plural izat ion or tensing: persons!  
purposes, expected/expressed, fe rre ted  /ferried, compromises/coincides.  These were  coun ted  as agreements ,  
since the level at which the er rors  arise (i.e. the lexicon, as will be argued below) surely does  not include 
marking for tense o r  number .
By “ same s tress  p a t t e rn " ,  we mean that the main lexical s tress  falls on equivalent  syllables in target 
and error .  Of course  this com par ison  canno t  be meaningfully performed with monosyl lables  or  with 
malapropisms in which the target and error  have differing num bers  o f  syllables. After  el iminating such pairs 
we com pared  the remaining I 16 pairs.
The level of agreement  on num ber  o f  syllables for m alaprop isms is not as high as for the o ther  
proper t ies  (although the difference in agreement  be tween malapropisms and semant ic  e r ro rs  is statistically 
significant). Perhaps  this co n co rdance  is due entirely to the similarity in length be tween  target  and error .  If 
so, syllable s t ruc tu re  would not be an organizing principle for  the lexicon as suggested below.
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dictionary to find a particular entry whose meaning and syntactic category match the 
specifications embodied in the grammatical s tructure.  If synonyms exist, the device will 
have to make a choice among the alternatives. Note  that the device might err slightly in 
reading the meaning specification of the word from the grammatical s tructure,  e.g. by 
switching the value of  a particular semantic feature.  It is possible that semantic errors 
such as those in (7)—(13) above might arise in this way. What is important for our 
purposes ,  however ,  is that the device knows two things about a word before it searches 
for it in the dictionary: on the one hand, its syntactic category (noun, verb, adjective, 
etc.),  and on the other,  its meaning.
No commitment  is implied in this brief sketch to any particular model of syntactic 
aspects  of speech production.  The production model must,  however ,  differ in at least 
one respect  from transformational grammars ,  as currently conceived.  This difference 
concerns  the way in which lexical items are inserted into syntactic structures.  Because 
of  its formal representat ion,  the grammar need not represent  the “ flow of information” 
in the derivation of  a sentence.  For  example,  there is no temporal sense in which 
lexical items are inserted “ before"  or “ a f te r"  the meaning of  the sentence is 
determined by the semantic component .  A production model,  however ,  does not have 
this f reedom. The only reasonable assumption to make in such a model is that the 
meaning of an u t terance is determined before the syntactic s tructure that will carry the 
meaning. In addition, syntactic s tructures must be constructed  on the basis of the 
meaning. We know little about what the process  of  construct ion is like, but it seems 
obvious that some part of the operation must involve the specification of the meanings 
of the lexical items to be used. In our  sketch of this process  we choose to think of the 
specified lexical meanings as a set of syntactic and semantic  features a t tached as leaves 
to the phrase s tructure  tree (there are, of  course ,  o ther  ways of  representing such 
information).  Given this set of features,  the speech production device can then look into 
the mental dictionary to find the appropriate  entry matching the features appended to 
the tree.
What is this mental dictionary,  or lexicon, like?9 We can conceive of it as similar to 
a printed dict ionary,  that is, as consisting of  pairings of  meanings with sound 
representa t ions .  A printed dictionary has listed at each entry a pronunciation of the 
word and its definition in terms of o ther  words.  In a similar fashion, the mental lexicon 
must represent  at least some aspects  of the meaning of  the word,  although surely not in 
the same way as does a printed dictionary; likewise, it must  include information about 
the pronuncia t ion of  the word although, again, probably not in the same form as an 
ordinary dictionary.  What is important  to notice about  dictionaries is that they must be 
lists, since the relation between sound and meaning is essentially arbitrary— with the 
exception of  the small subset  of  words formed by onom atopoeia  and those words 
formed by productive morphological processes  (see Aronoff  (1976)). Given the meaning
y We will use the terms dictionary  and lexicon  in terchangeably  to refer to the listing of  words  in the
head.
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of a word, there is no set of rules that one could invoke to construct  the pronunciation 
of the word,  and vice versa.
Such a pairing of sound and meaning must be used in both production and 
comprehension of speech. In production,  as outlined above, the device that searches 
for a word takes as input a meaning and a grammatical category,  and gives as output a 
sound representation.  In comprehension,  some representat ion of the sound of the word 
is input, and the meaning and syntactic category must be retrieved from the dictionary.
Consideration of the double use to which these m eaning-sound pairs are put raises 
the question of whether  there are separate dictionaries for production and com prehen­
sion, or simply a single listing that is used in both operations.  It might be argued that 
there should be two listings, since the optimal arrangement of  the entries for the 
purpose of comprehension is surely not the optimal arrangement for production. In the 
latter process,  the search for a word must be on the basis of meaning, whereas in 
comprehension it must proceed on the basis of sound. The relation between meaning 
and sound being arbitrary,  it would seem to be difficult to group together  words on the 
basis of both sound and meaning. Hence if optimal access  arrangements  are to be made 
available, separate  listings would appear  to be necessary.
On the o ther  hand, since the essential property of  a dictionary is simply the pairing 
of sound and meaning, separate  listings would entail that each sound-m ean ing  pair be 
simply duplicated. Any reasonable principle of economy of storage requires that 
duplication of this sort be avoided, hence that each pairing be listed only once— i.e. in a 
single dictionary. The evidence from malapropisms argues strongly that there is indeed 
ju s t  one mental dictionary.
We have noted a coincidence of syntactic category between target and error  on the 
one hand, and a coincidence in phonological properties on the other.  While the former 
might be expected to show up in errors made in the process of  accessing a dictionary 
arranged by the requirements of  production,  one would not predict in this case any 
relation between the sound of the error  and the sound of the target. That  is, if there 
exist two dictionaries,  separately accessed by the production and comprehension 
devices respectively,  there is no way to explain why errors  made in the process of word 
selection should show such a systematic relation in pronunciation to the words sought.
Supposing there to be jus t  one mental lexicon, however ,  a very simple explanation 
of this relationship is possible. First, let us consider  the principles by which such a 
single listing might be arranged. It is reasonable to assume that the arrangement should 
be such as to optimize accessibility; however,  as has already been pointed out, the 
optimal arrangements  for production and comprehension  purposes  respectively are 
different and apparently  incompatible. We have also seen already that the phonological 
similarity between target word and malapropism cannot  be explained if we assume the 
production device accesses a lexicon arranged along semantic lines; of  course,  this 
holds whether  we posit two listings, or one in which the arrangement  happens to be the 
one optimal for a  production device. What,  though, if there were a single lexicon,
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arranged on the principle of maximum usefulness for the comprehension device? Then 
we might expect  that near neighbors in the dictionary might be very similar in sound; 
we might expect  that if the production device, homing in on a particular word in the 
lexicon, were to err jus t  a little and pick, instead of its target word, that w o rd ’s “ next- 
door ne ighbor” , or a near neighbor, then the word it chose by mistake might sound 
very similar to the target word, but would be unlikely to bear any relation to it in 
meaning. We might expect ,  in other  words,  to find errors having exactly the 
characterist ics of malapropisms.
We have also noted, however ,  that malapropisms belong to the same syntactic 
category as their  targets. Does this imply that the mental dictionary is arranged by 
syntactic category,  and only within syntactic category by sound? Possibly this is true; 
certainly it would make things easier for the production device, which after all 
“ k n o w s”  what category it is looking for. On the other  hand, it is unlikely that the 
comprehension device knows the syntactic category of a word it is looking up, so that 
such an arrangement would be hard to justify from the point of view of comprehension 
requirements.  We know of no strong arguments either way on this point (but see Fay 
(1975) for further  discussion).
Let us assume,  then, that there is simply one mental dictionary, and that it is 
arranged according to the sounds of  the words it lists. The correspondence  of syllable 
structure and stress pattern between target and error in our collection of malapropisms 
suggests that these two properties may also be principles of arrangement for the 
dictionary, i.e. that the dictionary may list its entries according to syllable structure 
and/or stress pattern,  and only within these categories according to sound. This would 
presumably be useful in comprehension;  since the comprehension  device has seg­
mented the sentence or part of  a sentence into words before it begins to look up these 
words in the lex icon ,10 it is most likely the case that the syllable structure and stress 
pattern are included among the things it “ k n o w s” about each word it is seeking.
One might ask what method of access the production device has to this “ com pre­
hension-biased” lexicon. It would certainly be extremely inefficient if the production 
device were forced to conduct  an exhaustive search of the list every time it needed to 
find a  lexical item. Yet the order  in which the items are listed is apparently  not the 
order— semantic order— which the production device needs. Is there an alternative to 
listing, which would allow semantic information alone to be used to locate the exact 
address  of  a given lexical item?
Suppose the method of access  of  the production device to be a system of paths,  
having a com m on origin. Each fork in the path would represent  a choice between two 
(or more) values of a particular feature. The more general semantic features would 
obviously have their forks closer to the origin, the more specific features would occur
10 It may well be true that the device entertains s imultaneously a num ber  of  hypotheses  about  where 
word boundaries  fall. The hypothesis  that is finally chosen might then be the one in which all the putative 
words  have entr ies in the lexicon.
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further down the path system. The production device, given a set of  semantic features,  
would be able to proceed down the path, making a choice at every fork, until there 
were no more choices to be made, that is, until the path terminated in a particular 
word. (Since we have assumed the words to be listed by their sound properties,  we 
must assume this system of paths to resemble more a mess of  spaghetti than a neatly- 
arranged “ t r e e " .  Presumably this would not affect its viability as a thoroughfare,  
however.)
The above account  may appear  less than satisfactory, particularly in that the 
arrangement we have proposed for the production mechanism is not motivated by any 
empirical considerations.  There are, however ,  certain differences between the tasks of 
the comprehension  and production devices that render  this account  less arbitrary. 
Consider  the problem of noise. Any system implanted in biological material must 
overcome the problem of doing its computat ions  in the presence of  noise internal to the 
organism. On this count  production and comprehension  devices are on a par. However ,  
there is an additional source of  noise that the comprehension  device must contend 
with— external noise. It is rare that the comprehension device will be faced with 
interpreting a signal that is not embedded within a matrix of ex traneous  noise. The 
same is not true of  the production device; this we take to be a basic difference between 
the two. Where the comprehension device must retrieve the important  information in 
the speech signal from the irrelevant environmental  noise, the production mechanism 
has only to overcom e the internal noise.
In the case o f  lexical search this difference has an important  implication. The 
comprehension  device, but not the production device,  must be designed to consider  
alternative choices in comparing the incoming signal with the lexical entries. That  is, 
the comprehension  device will often be faced with deciding which of the lexical entries 
best matches the (incomplete,  distorted, and mashed) speech signal. If this is true, then 
it makes sense to list entries that have similar phonological propert ies  “ n ea r"  each 
other,  thus facilitating comparison and choice of  the best match. The production 
device,  on the o ther  hand, is presumably never faced with the situation of  finding the 
best match to an incompletely specified input: the device can be as precise as it desires 
in determining the propert ies  of the entry it is seeking.
It is this fundamental  difference between com prehension  and production,  and the 
empirical evidence presented here that the lexicon is arranged by sound propert ies ,  that 
have prompted our two proposals;  first, that the basic a rrangement  of  the lexicon is by 
phonological segments  for the purpose of  aiding com prehens ion ,  and second,  that the 
accessing a rrangem ent  for production is by means of  a network.  This latter proposal is, 
of  course ,  quite unspecific, and the intent is only to provide an example of  how the 
accessing might be accomplished to contras t  it with access  in com prehens ion .  We will 
have no more to say about how the lexicon is accessed  in production and look forward 
to the time when a more specific hypothesis  can be proposed.
Let us now return to the mental dictionary and the nature of  its a rrangement .  We
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have said nothing so far about the details of the ordering by sound properties.  On this 
point the correspondences  noted between target words and errors are able to shed 
some light. Consider  the process of comprehension;  we assume that the speech 
perception device converts  a sound wave representing an utterance into a string of 
phonemes marked for syllable boundaries,  stress pattern,  and word boundaries.  We 
know little about how this might take place, but it is commonly assumed that some 
such conversion must be made. (In fact, this is ju s t  the problem of speech perception.)  
Assume further that the words,  so segmented,  are looked up in the dictionary on the 
basis of this phonological “ spelling” , using a left-to-right conven t ion .11 So, for 
example,  to locate cat (/kaet/), the device goes first to the section reserved for one- 
syllable words beginning with /k/, then to the subsection of words beginning /kae/, and 
then finally to words beginning /kaet/. It is here that the device will find an entry f o r e « /  
with the a t tached information about  syntactic category and meaning. N ow  what can we 
say about  the sound properties of the words that are “ nea r” the entry ca t? One 
hypothesis that we might entertain is that the entries are arranged on the basis of 
distinctive features of the kind proposed by Jakobson  and Halle (1956). Thus the 
nearest entry (of the same length) would be c a d , since the last phoneme,  /d/, differs 
from /[/ only on the feature of voicing. Fur ther  away would be such entries as can, cab , 
ca m , and so on, which differ from cat on more than one feature.
The distinctive feature hypothesis ,  in conjunction with the left-to-right convention,  
predicts that at the point at which target and error  depart  from being identical (counting 
from the left), the two words would be very close in feature marking. To test this 
hypothesis  on the malapropism data,  we have eliminated those ta rge t -e r ro r  pairs that 
differ in syntactic category,  syllable s tructure ,  or stress pattern.  Our  justification for 
this is that the correspondences  noted above for these properties are so high that it 
would be suspect  not to treat them as categorical properties of malapropisms. We might 
expect  that although we eliminated from consideration other  known kinds of word 
substitution errors ,  we may well have included some as yet unrecognized types of 
errors.  Elimination of these errors  may provide us with a more truly representat ive 
sample. Note  that this move in no way increases the chances  that our  hypothesis  will 
be supported  by the data,  since the examples we eliminated were excluded independ­
ently of  w he ther  the data  show the sound properties predicted by our  hypothesis.
Having excluded possible contaminations,  we can perform a feature counting 
ana lys is12 on the remaining 156 malapropisms. To take an example of how this is done, 
consider  the pair m a p —m a ke . We first transcribe the target and error  into phonological 
segments:  /mcep/-/mek/. Then ,  counting from the left, we note that it is the second
11 Simple left-to-right ordering is not the only possibility,  o f  course .  F o r  example ,  one might imagine the 
primary principle o f  classification to be the form of  the s tressed syllable; o r  that the head of the entry is the 
s tem of  the w ord— minus its affixes. See fn. 15 for fur ther  discussion of  this issue.
n For  a distinctive feature analysis  o f  the phonem es  of  English we have used that  given in Lehm ann  
(1972, 98). This par t icu lar  analysis  is a modified version of the C hom sky  and Halle (1968) feature chart ;  it 
e l iminates from considera t ion  phonem es  that never  a p p e a r  in phonetic  representa t ions .
i
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segment at which the transcriptions first differ. Next ,  we compare the marking of these 
two segments on distinctive features. They are marked identically on all features but 
( low). On this feature,  /se/ is marked “  + ” and /e/ is marked “  — Thus we assign one 
feature difference to this pair. The results of all 156 comparisons  are presented in Fig.
1, opposite.
It can be seen that,  in general,  the greater  the number  of  feature differences, the 
fewer cases we find. By way of comparison,  we have performed a distinctive feature 
analysis on 59 semantic errors (those of  the 79 semantic  errors  mentioned previously 
that agree on stress and syllable structure). The results of  this analysis are also shown 
in Fig. 1, and it can be seen that the maximum value of  the curve falls, not at one 
feature difference, but at four.
We should note that 22 of  the 156 malapropisms involve vow el-consonan t  
comparisons.  These  cases produce all of  the spread beyond 7 differently-marked 
fea tu re s .13 We might also account  for some of the spread beyond one feature by noting 
that there are many lacunae in the dictionary. For  example,  if we compare  equivocal 
and equivalent we find that there is no o ther  three-syllable word that is more like 
equivalent than equivocal . 14 Yet if we compare  them at the point at which they depart  
from identity,  /l/ versus /k/, we find that they differ on seven features.  Thus  even if two 
words are listed next to each other  in the dictionary we cannot  guarantee  that they will 
differ on only one or even a few features.  It is remarkable ,  in fact,  that our  analysis 
shows such close correspondence  on feature marking.
It appears ,  then, that the listing of  words in the mental lexicon may be done on the 
basis of  a distinctive feature system. Those words that begin with the same phoneme 
are listed together ,  those that have the same second phoneme form a subcategory of 
that class, and so on. Adjacent categories on the same level are minimally different in 
terms of  their  feature markings.
Let  us summarize  here the main propert ies  of  the mental dictionary as suggested 
by malapropisms.
(a) There  is a single dictionary used for production and com prehension .
(b) In this dictionary,  words are arranged by phonemic s t ruc ture ,  in a left-to-right 
m a n n e r ,15 and based on a distinctive feature system.
1! These  com par isons  result in large differences because  not all features  apply to both consonan ts  and 
vowels.  We have treated all com par isons  in which one segment is marked on a fea ture ,  while the o the r  is not, 
as being differences in feature marking.  Tha t  is, the difference is t rea ted  as if one segment  were marked “  +  “  
and the o ther  “  —”  on that feature.
"  This  is true only if the listing is parti t ioned by grammatical  ca tegory .  If it is not,  then the verb 
equivocate  is p resum ably  listed c loser  to equivocal  than is equiva len t. H o w ever ,  as ment ioned earlier,  there 
is no reason to believe that equivocate  would ap p ea r  as a malapropism for equivocal  because  of  this 
difference in syntact ic  category.
As noted above ,  there are o the r  possibilities for a r rangem ent  o f  the phonological  specif icat ion of  a 
word.  H ow ever ,  none of  the o the r  obvious  candida tes  seem s to fit the da ta  as well as the one assum ed  here.  
Briefly, one can test the hypothesis  that the s tressed syllable,  ra ther  than the first syllable,  heads a lexical 
entry  by determining w he the r  first syllables o r  s t ressed syllables are m ore  alike be tween  target  and error .  A 
simple com par ison  o f  how often the vowels of the respect ive  syllables are  identical show s  that first vowels
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(c) The major partitioning of the dictionary, however ,  seems to be by number  of 
syllables, with stress pattern as a second categorization within syllable ca te ­
gories.
(d) Words may also be arranged by syntactic category.
Our model provides,  we think, a reasonable outline for a mental dictionary. There 
is, however ,  one area of  this study in which we feel that a major revision, of  some 
importance,  may be necessary.  In our  distinctive feature analysis we used a level of 
description closely corresponding to that of  au tonom ous  phonemics.  Although this 
level is sufficient for our purposes,  we might ask whether  it is the appropriate  level of 
description for the mental dictionary. Chomsky and Halle have argued persuasively in 
The Sound Pattern o f  English (1968) that a deeper  level of analysis,  that of  systematic 
phonemes,  is necessary to explain the underlying regularities of the sound structure of  
English. Their  analysis raises the question of  w he ther  the mental lexicon may not 
likewise be based on systematic phonemes.  In fact, there is some evidence from speech 
errors that such an analysis is appropriate.  Fromkin (1974, 21) gives examples of 
segmental misordering such as that in (14):
(14) T: swing and sway
E: swin and swaig
These examples can be explained quite simply if one adopts an analysis in which the 
sequence,  /ng/, underlies the surface segment / /. Since there are two segments in the 
underlying form, the Igl is free to move independently of  the /n/, giving rise to such 
ut terances  as (14).
If this argument is correct ,  we should expect  that a reanalysis of  our  data  on this 
deeper  level would provide a simpler description of  the sound relations between targets 
and malapropism errors.  Although we have not yet found convincing arguments  that 
this is true, there are certain hints that a deeper  analysis would be desirable.  We 
noticed that a num ber  of  ta rge t -e r ro r  pairs involved the comparison of /y/ with a vowel 
at the point of departure .  We list these examples in (15):
(15) Error Target
a. musician magician
b. m u s e u m s 1“ machines
c. emanate  emulate
d. review revise
are identical in 83% of  the cases ,  while s tressed vowels  are the same in only 65% of  the cases  (a significant 
difference),  el iminating those com par isons  in which first vowel and stressed vowel coincide.
Alternatively,  one might think that phonological entr ies are listed right-to-left. Again, how ever ,  the data  
indicate o therwise .  An analysis  o f  the feature differences at the point o f  depar tu re ,  counting from the right, 
show s  no difference between malapropisms and semantic  errors .  It seems then that the left-to-right 
hypothes is  is the correc t  one.
If' In the speech  of  the person who made this error ,  m useum s  has two syllables ([myuzimz]).  Thus ,  
despite  initial ap p ea ran ces ,  this is not an example o f  d isagreement  on syllable s tructure .
M A L A P R O P I S M S  A N D  T H E  S T R U C T U R E  O F  T H E  M E N T A L  L E X I C O N
e. genuine general
f. movie music
It is interesting in this regard that Chomsky and Halle propose a rule (1968, 192ff.) that 
inserts a lyl before certain vowels. If this rule applies in the examples above,  we should 
compare  the target and error  words at a level before the /y/-insertion rule had applied. 
This would mean that the comparison at the departure  point would be between two 
vowels rather  than between a vowel and a glide. This is surely an intuitively appealing 
step, and it results in a decrease in the marking differences in the above examples.  
W hether  a reanalysis at the level of systematic phonemes would result in an overall 
simplification in the description of our data  is a complex issue beyond the scope of this 
article.
Although in this respect our model is open to further elaboration, we feel that the 
evidence from malapropisms has supplied some insight into aspects  of linguistic 
performance.  In particular,  it has provided evidence for the existence of but one mental 
lexicon, and for the organization of the entries in the lexicon according to phonological 
properties.  We hope that this account  may prove of value for the construction of more 
detailed and explicit descriptions of the processes involved in language use.
Appendix
Error Target
lawn line
gaudy gory
museums machines
easy early
determination denomination
position condition
emancipated emaciated
tambourines trampolines
spell tell
t ransistor transition
bothering borrowing
borrow bother
equivocal equivalent
accident appetite
participate precipitate
musician magician
subjective suggestive
expert exploit
straddles sidles
recession remission
Error Target
week work
map make
emanate emulate
insect index
conclusion confusion
finger fender
read teach
review revise
trick treat
trip treat
money difference
accurate adequate
water weather
read met
store straw
deserved diverged
analogy analysis
single signal
analyze advertise
open over
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divergence diversion
photogenic photographic
magicians musicians
bothered buttered
take turn
convention confession
continued considered
article argument
windows winters
work week
reverse release
verb nerve
analysis analogy
movie music
earlier easier
place piece
problem feeling
wore read
case course
entrees encores
got gave
persons purposes
ludicrous lucrative
wait watch
downstairs downtown
parents papers
label level
complete construct
built bought
cold closed
downhill downwind
shop stop
count cost
street sleep
chance choice
composed compared
dictionaries dignitaries
room dream
onion oven
crea tor equator
symbolize signify
happy healthy
errors errands
winter window
inoculation inauguration
wound womb
easy early
genuine general
experience experiment
follicles particles
only almost
box book
juniors journals
produce pronounce
miraculous spectacular
photogenic photographic
do take
sum m er Sunday
corrected constructed
provocation indication
project progress
musicians magicians
early easy
song sound
lawn line
advertised averaged
punch pump
require recover
brought built
expected expressed
subways suburbs
slow short
confidence com petence
air age
specification specialization
pretended presented
demonstra t ing devastating
participation precipitation
deliverable divisible
conversion convergence
operat ions occupations
tentative tenable
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result resort count call
gouge gorge confirm concern
camera calendar met read
rest wash left lost
linking lurking crawled cried
recipe remedy advertising agitating
experience experiments inclination intimation
prescriptive predictive apartment appointment
bleed breathe liood glad
closed cleaned shield shed
downstairs downtown powerful popular
blankly blindly inclusion intrusion
fire follow hospital holiday
save hold writing waiting
improve intrude result regard
miraculously mysteriously advertising advocating
definitions derivations ferreted ferried
Pairs differing in stress, number o f  syllables, or grammatical category’:
Error Target Error Target
discovering describing discovered described
manifested manufactured compromises coincides
tactical tactful section second
area error optionally optically
risk resist certainly shortly
money noise radio radiator
dollars years risk resist
intoxicate entice particle participle
hemorrhoid hemorrhage evidence errors
accident accent easily early
offer owe effort benefit
edification medication comm ent compliment
opportunity alternative technology terminology
com pany country
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